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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

F E D E R A L DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, S u c c e s s o r in
i n t e r e s t to FIRST NATIONAL
BANK O F COALVILLE,
Plaintiff/ Respondent,
C a s e No. 14098

vs.
BISMARCK INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a c o r p o r a t i o n ,
Defendant
R. M. HART,
Defendant /Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT O F THE KIND O F CASE
T h i s i s an action brought by the F e d e r a l Deposit I n s u r a n c e
C o r p o r a t i o n to enforce a Guaranty A g r e e m e n t attached to the Complaint
executed by both of the defendants and s e c u r e d by 1, 629 s h a r e s of stock
of F i r s t A m e r i c a n Bank and T r u s t Company.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
T h e c a s e was t r i e d to the C o u r t , judgment e n t e r e d for plaintiff
against the defendant R. M. H a r t , and said defendant a p p e a l s .

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks r e v e r s a l of the judgment and judgment that
the matter be stayed until bankruptcy proceedings in North Dakota
have been concluded and the value of the securities pledged to secure
payment of the guaranty determined.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff commenced its action by filing a Complaint in the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in Summit County,

|

j
i

!

alleging that it was the successor to the F i r s t National Bank of Coalville.

{

The basis of the Complaint is a Guaranty Agreement which was attached

i
i

to the Complaint and the execution of which was admitted by defendant.
Payments were made on the amount of the obligation in the sums of
$24, 516. 47 at the time of execution, the 11th of January, 1971.

I
i
f

i

Thereafter, on December 1, 1971, an additional payment of $29, 597. 26
i

was made which paid $25, 000. 00 on the principal balance, with $4, 597. 26

i

being applied to interest.

•

As of the time of t r i a l , the balance owing on

i

principal was $175, 000. 00 with interest thereon to April 1, 1975 in the
amount of $32, 666. 00, which made a total balance payable of $207, 666. 00.
Judgment for said sum was granted, together with attorney 1 s fees in the
amount of $5, 000. 00 and $22. 00 costs, $216, 666. 00.
Plaintiff's Complaint was served on the defendants in North
Dakota on the 26th of December, 1973, but no responsive pleading was
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filed until May 31, 1974, five months and five days after the acknowledgment of service. The first pleading filed by defendants was a Motion
to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, claiming that the United States Code
Annotated, Title 28, Section 1345, required the filing of an action by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the Federal Court or at
lease made the same a matter of discretion which should be exercised
in favor of such filing by the State Court.
This motion was denied and the defendants answered, preserving
their defense and objection to the jurisdiction of the court, admitted
the status of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the nature
of the Bismarck Investment Corporation, but denied all the other
allegations and put the defendant on its proof concerning the same.
On or about the 31st of March, 1975, defendant Bismarck
Investment Corporation, by and through its North Dakota attorneys,
advised the plaintiff that Bismarck Investment Corporation had filed a
petition for an arrangement in bankruptcy under Chapter 11. The
applicable rule in such proceeding is Rule 11-44. It reads as follows:
f,

(a) Stay of Actions and Lien Enforcement.
A petition filed under Rule 11-6 or 11-7
shall operate as a stay of the commencement
or the continuation of any court or other
proceeding against the debtor, or the
enforcement of any judgment against him,
or of any act or the commencement or
continuation of any court proceeding to
enforce any lien against his property, o r
of any court proceedings, except a case
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pending under Chapter X of the Act, for the
purpose of the rehabilitation of the debtor or
the liquidation of his estate. n United States
Code Annotated, Bankruptcy Rules and Official
Bankruptcy F o r m s , Rule 11-4, page 329.
The bankruptcy proceeding and the rules were called to the
attention of the Court, counsel for defendant moved that the proceeding

!

be stayed, not only as to Bismarck Investment Corporation, co-defendant,
i

but to R. M. Hart, appellant.

It was defendants position that the

guaranty was a joint obligation and the Court could not proceed against
one joint obligor when stayed as to the other.

l

(R. 4)

It was conceded by plaintiff that the proceeding against the
defendant Bismarck Investment Corporation would stay the proceeding

.
1
1

as to it, but objected to staying the proceeding as to the other defendant,

.

R. M. Hart.

,

(R. 5-6)

The Court determined as a matter of law that the guaranty

i
1

executed by Bismarck Investment and R. M. Hart was both joint and

j

several and refused to stay the proceedings as to R. M. Hart.

i

Judgment

i

was then entered in favor of the plaintiff and against R. M. Hart and
1

stayed as to the defendant Bismarck Investment Corporation.

(See

Findings of Fact, R. 31-33, and Judgment R. 27-28)

i
i
i

Defendant did not elect to proceed.

Plaintiff put on the evidence
I

relating to its claim, witnesses were cross-examined, and the judgment

•

described entered against the defendant R. M. Hart.

*
m

m
m
m

-4-

ARGUMENT
Point 1. The Guaranty Agreement is a joint obligation only
and should have been so interpreted by the Court.
Point 2. The Court should have dismissed the Complaint
and ordered the plaintiff to file its action in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah.
Point 3. The Court should have ordered the stay of
proceedings as to both defendants until the arrangement in bankruptcy
had been concluded with the other defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE GUARANTY AGREEMENT IS A JOINT OBLIGATION ONLY
AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN SO INTERPRETED BY THE COURT.
It is appellant's position that the obligation which he undertook
by reason of the guaranty, Exhibit

M

An attached to the Complaint,

page 3-4 of the Record, is a joint obligation only.
The crucial language from the first page of the guaranty reads
as follows:
ff

The undersigned R. M. Hart and Bismarck
Investment Corporation do hereby guarantee
and agree to pay you the sum of $200, 000. 00. fl
Throughout the guaranty, there is repeated use of the word
"undersigned" and the undersigned appear to be Bismarck Investment
Corporation and R. M. Hart.

There is no place in the guaranty where
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there is any mention of several obligations.

The Trial Court placed

an interpretation on the guaranty interpreting it as a joint and several
obligation and refused to stay proceedings as to R. M. Hart, even
though Bismarck Investment Corporation, by reason of it's Chapter 11
bankruptcy application, could not be proceeded against.
The guaranty contains additional clauses which, it is appellants
position, clearly show that the parties to the agreement intended it to
be only a joint obligation.

Appellant specifically refers to the paragraph
i

of the guaranty, page 3, where the undersigned agree that the guaranty
will be secured by 1, 629 shares of stock of the First American Bank

<j
i

and Trust Company.

The stock is recited as being in the possession
I

of the plaintiff and requires the nundersignedM to execute a pledge

|

agreement pledging the stock.

i
a

There is no reference made in the Complaint to the First
American Bank and Trust Company stock and no credit given on the

1
i

obligation guaranteed for its reasonable value.

i

Nor did the plaintiff

i

request an order of the Court permitting foreclosure and sale of said
l

security.

*
Appellant submits that the pledge is clear evidence that parties

"
l

intended the obligation to be joint.

That prior to any action against

either of the guarantors, a credit would be made for the reasonable
value of the stock, whatever that may be. After its sale, for the first

time, the personal obligation of guarantors could be determined as
to amount.
Plaintiff cited to the T r i a l Court the provisions of the laws
of the State of Utah, Section 15-4-1, etc, , for the basic proposition
that the Court should proceed against the appellant, even though there
was a stay as to the defendant Bismarck Investment Corporation.
Utah Code Annotated 15-4-1, etc. , while it defines a number of the
t e r m s and defines several obligors, does not define joint obligors,
and while it provides for credit on joint obligations where payment is
made by one of the p a r t i e s , there is nothing in the section, as far as
appellant can determine, that would indicate that the common law is
not applicable to joint obligations.
As has been demonstrated by the preceding information, the
obligation undertaken was by both Bismarck Investment Corporation
and R. M. Hart and the only language of the guaranty is in the conjunctive,
and at no place in the guaranty is there any indication that the obligation
undertaken was to be a several obligation.
It appears to appellant from examination of the law applicable,
that under these circumstances there is a uniform rule applicable.
The rule, appellant submits, i s :
"Whenever an obligation is undertaken by two
or more persons, it is the general presumption
of the law that it is a joint obligation. Words
of express joinder are not necessary for this
purpose; but, on the other hand, there should
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be words of severance in order to create a
several responsibility. M Willison on Contracts,
3rd Edition, Volume 2, Section 320, page 650.
i

Williston cites many authorities for the rule quoted and
appellant has examined additional authorities and is unable to find any
kind of dissent from the basic proposition set forth in the Williston quote.
A case which quotes extensively the rule cited is Siivertooth
v. Kelley, 162 Or. 381, 91 P . 2d 1112. The Supreme Court of Oregon
there set forth what plaintiff submits is a sound rule and should have
been applied by the T r i a l Court and requires, it is appellant's position,
a r e v e r s a l of his decision:
n

[8, 9] In determining whether the contract is
joint or several, the intention of the parties
controls: 12 American Jurisprudence 814. The
ownership of the stock in severalty is an important
factor, but such fact does not conclusively refute
the idea of a joint obligation.
f,

[10] In Williston on Contracts, 1st Ed. , §322,
the rule is thus stated: 'Following the analogy of
the rule of real property that an estate granted to
two persons created a joint tenancy rather than a
tenancy in common, it was clearly held and,
except as changed by statute, the law remains
that promises by two or more persons create
a joint duty unless the contrary is stated. ! It is
a general presumption of law when two or more
persons undertake an obligation that they undertake
jointly, words of severance are necessary to
overcome this primary presumption. ' The fact
that the interests of the obligors in the contract
a r e diverse, does not prevent the duty from
being joint. But where, as in a subscription
paper, the obligors state the amount of the

subscription of each, each is liable for only
that amount, although there may be no words
of severance in the promise. This may be
contrary to early law, but it is supposed to
be, and doubtless i s , in accord with the
intention of the p a r t i e s . And there may be
other cases where the interests a r e so closely
several, that a court will disregard the ordinary
presumption. If by agreement or implication
of law the contract of two or more obligors
with their obligee is joint, the obligee is
entitled to enforce the obligation as a joint
one, and is not bound by any agreement, of
which he was ignorant, of the obiigors severally
with one another, that each shall be liable for
a ratable share. 1
M

In 6 R. C. L. 878, §266, it is said: In some
jurisdictions the rule prevails that an obligation
in solido will never be presumed. But the
general rule is that an obligation entered into
by more than one person is presumed to be joint,
and that a several responsibility will not arise
except by words of severance. In other words,
an obligation undertaken by two is presumably
joint, in the absence of express words to render
it joint and several, or a statute declaring every
contract, though joint in its t e r m s , to be several
as well as joint. One of the rules for determining
whether a contract is joint is whether the interest
of the parties in the subject matter is joint.
"In Hill v. Combs, 92 Mo. App. 242, it was said:
'Under the common law, where two or more
persons undertake the performance of an obligation,
the presumption is that the undertaking was joint.
Words of express joinder are not necessary for
this purpose. Words of severance a r e required to
produce a several responsibility, and in the absence
of such words the undertaking is joint and not several. !
Citing Bliss on Code Plead. §92; 1 Parsons on Contr.
(6th Ed. ), p. 11; Pomeroy on Rem. and Rem. Rights,
p . 329.

n

[11] Applying the above legal principles to
the facts in the instant case, we a r e convinced
that the contract is joint since the services
rendered by plaintiff were for the joint benefit
of all the stockholders and not for the particular
benefit of any one of them. Wolfenbarger v.
Britt, 105 Neb. 773, 181 N.W. 932, is particularly
in point. M
Wiiiiston also sets forth the rule that where an obligation is
joint, the Court must proceed, until final judgment, to consider the
obligation as joint and to grant only joint o r d e r s .

The language of

his rule is set forth in Section 327, Wiiiiston on Contracts, 3rd Edition,
Volume 2, p . 670, as follows:
fr

Today, however, it is generally held, even in
the absence of statutes, that if the objection is
not properly made, the defect is waived. But
as to all who a r e made parties defendant the
duty of joinder continues until final judgment,
and in o r d e r to sustain an appeal or writ of e r r o r
ail joint obligors who a r e defendants below must
be made parties to the proceedings. In an action
against several defendants on an alleged joint
contract a failure to prove a joint liability on
the part of all has been held at common law to
preclude a recovery against either party, the
variance being fatal.
"Since the obligation assumed by joint contractors
is single and there is but a single cause of action
for breach of a joint contract the court can render
only one judgment in an action for breach of such
a contract. To give a separate judgment against
each of the different parties would be inconsistent
with the singleness of the obligation. So it is
held at common law that the court cannot in such
an action render judgment against one defendant
and in favor of another, but only one judgment in
favor of or against all. Those omitted cannot be

:*

sued separately for they have incurred no
several obligation. Nor can they be sued
jointly with the defendants in the first action
because judgment has already been rendered
against the latter and the latter cannot be
subjected to a second suit on the same obligation.
fl

If a joint judgment cannot be supported as to
all the defendants, it is erroneous as to all. n
Williston supplies many citations and texts to support his
general rule. One of the clear statements is found in Templeton v.
Morrison, 66 Or. 493, 131 P . 319, at 320, where the following
language is used:
u

In an action against joint debtors, where only
common defenses a r e maintained, a judgment
should be rendered against all or none. Fisk v.
Henarie, 14 Or. 29, 13 Pac. 193; Wilson v.
Blakeslee, 16 Or. 43, 47, 16 P a c . 872;
Thomas v. Barnes, 34 Or. 416, 56 Pac. 7 3 . "
In addition to the cases cited, a direct holding supporting
a p p e l l a n t s position is found in Morrison v. American Surety Co. of
New York, 2 2 4 P a . 41, 73 Atl. 10:

'

"MESTREZAT, J. In Sheppard's Touchstone
it is said (page 375): !If two, three, or more
bind themselves in an obligation thus, obligamus
nos, and say no more, the obligation is and
shall be taken to be joint only, and not several. *
In other words, the presumption of the law is
that, when two or more enter into a contract
o r an obligation without adding language disclosing
a different intention, the undertaking is a joint
and not a several one. This rule has been
uniformly recognized and adhered to in all our
cases.n
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It is respectfully submitted that the Guaranty Agreement is
a joint obligation only and that a stay of proceedings should have
been granted as to defendant and appellant as well as to defendant
Bismarck Investment Corporation.
POINT II
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT AND
ORDERED THE PLAINTIFF TO FILE ITS ACTION IN THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT O F UTAH.
The record shows that the defendants admitted service and
that no actual service of summons was accomplished on either of
them. (R. 005)

This admission of service was dated the 26th day of

December, 1973. F r o m that time until the 30th of May, no pleading
was made or motion filed by either of defendants.

Apparently, during

that time negotiations were carried on and attempts were made between
the parties to settle their differences.
There is no question but what the United States Code provides
for original jurisdiction of ail civil actions where the United States is
a party shall

be in the United States District Courts.

U. S. Code

Annotated, Title 28, Section 1345, so provides.
Title 28, Section 1441, U. S. Code Annotated, grants the
right to a defendant to remove to the District Court of the United
States from the State Court any civil action brought in which the District
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Courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.

Such is the

case now before the Court under the provisions of U. S.C. A. Section
1345.
Had the defendants moved promptly, they had an absolute
right of removal from the Utah State Court to the United States District
Court.

The procedure for such removal is described and provided in

Title 28, Section 1446, U. S. Code Annotated.

Under said section,

the defendants had 30 days from the receipt through service or otherwise of a copy of the initial pleadings setting forth the claim for relief.
Defendants did not file their motion within the 30 days provided by the
Federal Code.
On the 31st day of May, 1974, the defendants did file such a
motion to request that the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District
dismiss the case pending there for lack of jurisdiction, and further
moved the Court for removal upon the ground that the United States
District Court is better able to apply federal law arising on the matter
than the District Court of the State of Utah.
page 6)

(See defendants Motion,

This motion was argued and the Honorable George E. Ballif

denied defendants motion.

Defendant R. M. Hart submits that this

was e r r o r .
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POINT III
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED THE STAY OF PROCEEDINGS
AS TO BOTH DEFENDANTS UNTlL THE ARRANGEMENT IN
BANKRUPTCY HAD BEEN CONCLUDED WITH THE OTHER
DEFENDANT.
One of the reasons cited in defendant's Motion to Dismiss

i
i

was the ground that United States District Court was more familiar
and better able to apply federal law. What has now developed in this

!
i

case demonstrates that this ground was a sound ground and, in the

!
«

exercise of discretion, the T r i a l Court should have dismissed the

1

matter pending and permitted plaintiff to file its action in the United

i
i

States District Court for the District of Utah, o r in the United States

i

District Court for the District of North Dakota where both defendants

i
i

reside.
The defendant Bismarck Investment Corporation, all parties
were informed, filed under the United States Code Bankruptcy Section,

I
i

1
1

Title 11, Section 701, etc. , governing arrangements, commonly known
I

as Rule 11-44 which stays ail proceedings against a debtor filing under

i

Rule 11.

»
i

The guaranty which plaintiff seeks to enforce is secured by
1, 629 shares of stock of the F i r s t American Bank and Trust Company.

•
«

(R. 3)

*

Under Chapter 11 the exclusive control over assets of the

bankrupt is in the United States District Court and its referee in

•
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m

bankruptcy, and the exact disposition of the security would then
depend on the kinds of arrangements the Court made for payment of
the bankrupt's creditors and other people having claims, including
plaintiff.
Appellant sought to obtain a stay of proceedings until the
arrangement outcome had been determined and the other defendant's
assets aligned to pay whatever obligations it owed, and until such
arrangement has been completed and the Bankruptcy Court made
disposition of a s s e t s , it would be impossible to tell just what amount,
if any, will remain to be paid by the individual defendant and appellant,
R. M. Hart.

Trial Court refused a stay of proceedings against R. M.

Hart and it is appellant ! s position that this was e r r o r .
It has always been the law of the State of Utah that there can
be but one action to collect or recover on a debt secured by real property,
and the rationale of this ruling, defendant-appellant submits, is
applicable to the proceedings now before the Court.

In Coburn v.

Bartholomew, 50 Utah 566, 167 P . 1156, this Court recited the
rationale for a single proceeding on debts secured by mortgage or
pledge:
fl

To affirm this judgment without requiring
the plaintiff to first proceed against the fund
or property set apart for that purpose,
especially as it stands in plaintiff's name,
would be to give plaintiff an unfair advantage
and probably lead to further litigation in order
to determine the rights of the p a r t i e s . This
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question has given us more concern than any
other question in the case. Comp. Laws 1907,
section 3498, in part, provides as follows:
'There can be but one action for the
recovery of any debt or the enforcement
of any right secured by mortgage upon
real estate or personal property, which
action must be in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter, f etc.
The section then provides for a sale of the mortgaged
property according to the provisions of law relating
to sales on execution. Respondent's contention
that he was not, in this case, compelled to foreclose his lien upon the water stock is in
contravention, not only of the express language
of the statute we have quoted, but the decisions
of this court heretofore rendered. Bacon v.
Raybould, 4 Utah 347, 10 P a c . 510; Boucofski v.
Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P a c . 117, 2 6 L . R . A.
(N.S. ) 898. n Pg. U-572.
While the rule recited in the Coburn v. Bartholomew case,
supra, applies to real property and the language specifically mentions
r e a l property, it is respectfully submitted that the same basic
considerations that applied and were recited in the Coburn case exist
in a situation such as is presently before the Court where personal
property is pledged to secure a guaranty.
Appellant respectfully submits that to permit the plaintiff to
proceed only against him and there being no possibility, because of
the Chapter 11 proceeding, of a proceeding against the other defendant,
would be unfair and, as stated in the Coburn case, would probably lead
to additional litigation after the stock had been liquidated and the
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arrangement terminated and whatever assets defendant Bismarck
Investment Corporation had or could apply to this obligation realized
upon.
CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully submits that the Court should r e v e r s e
the judgment of the T r i a l Court, determine that the guaranty is a joint
obligation only, and that the stay as to Bismarck Investment Corporation,
defendant, required also a stay as to the defendant R. M. Hart on the
joint obligation.
Respectfully submitted.
DWIGHT L. KING
2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorney for R. M. Hart,
Defendant/Appellant
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